Returns to Schooling, Institutions and Heterogeneous Diploma Effects: An Expanded Mincerian Framework applied to Mexico by Mehta, Aashish & Villarreal, Hector J.
  University of Wisconsin-Madison 










 Returns to Schooling, Institutions and Heterogeneous Diploma 





Aashish Mehta and Hector J. Villarreal 
 
__________________________________ 
    














Copyright © 2003 Aashish Mehta and Hector J. Villarreal.  All rights reserved.  Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 
that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.  
 
Returns to Schooling, Institutions and Heterogeneous Diploma Effects: 


















We hypothesize two sources for sheepskin effects – signaling, and diplomas tied to jobs 
with downwards rigid wages.  These theories have implications for diploma effects not 
only in the first, but also the second moments of the Mincerian earnings distribution that 
we are able to identify using a flexible econometric specification.  Idiosyncrasies in 
Mexican labor market and educational institutions offer a natural experiment on which to 
train this methodology and test these theories.  Correcting for heterogeneity in diplomas, 
we find no evidence of sheepskin effects, except on graduation from primary school.  We 
find compelling evidence that returns to education (in both moments) are linked with 
labor market institutions and job-specific diplomas in the manner we hypothesize.  Our 
econometric structure corrects for sample selectivity due to unemployment and allows us 
to observe behavior on the quantity axis of a labor market segmented by sheepskin 
effects.  We also analyze the covariates of hours worked which helps to explain observed 
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I.  Introduction: 
  A large literature has grown around the methods of Mincer (1974), which involve 
regression of the natural logarithms of workers’ wages against vectors containing 
measures of educational attainment and work experience.  The coefficients on these 
vectors may be interpreted to yield a measure of the percentage increase in wages 
statistically attributable to particular elements of educational and work experience.  
Further, to the extent that forgone wages constitute the bulk of the indirect cost of 
education, predicted wage increases can be used to compute partial private rates of return 
to investments in education.   
  A sheepskin effect has traditionally been defined as a statistical tendency for the 
expected wage to increase significantly at diploma years as compared with non-diploma 
years.  We generalize that definition.  We define a sheepskin effect as a tendency for the 
first or second moments of the wage distribution to change significantly at diploma years 
as compared with non-diploma years.  This is important because, as we argue below, the 
circumstances that can give rise to sheepskin effects in first moments have even stronger 
testable implications for the second moments of the wage distribution.  We utilize a 
maximum likelihood structure to identify, estimate and test for sheepskin effects in both 
moments of the earnings distribution. 
  The Mincerian equation looks only at the price of labor, not the quantity.  Thus, 
while intuitively finding a sheepskin effect may indicate something other than a 
Walrasian equilibrium in the labor market, it doesn’t suffice to characterize that 
equilibrium.  We therefore include a Mincerian specification of an employment equation.  
This allows us to investigate how the quantity side of the labor market adjusts to 
discontinuities in price. 
  The traditional literature on sheepskin effects is closely connected to signaling 
theories originating with Arrow (1973) and Spence (1974).  While most empirical papers 
allude to the old wisdom that signaling is neither necessary (Chiswick - 1973, Hungerford 
and Solon - 1987) nor sufficient (Riley - 1979) for sheepskin effects, they do not present 
any alternatives seriously.  More recent work that builds from the dynamic optimization 
framework originating in Becker (1967) has highlighted the role of institutions and 
government policy on the returns to education.
  Card (2001) provides an excellent survey   4
of this literature.  These institutions include minimum wages, collective bargaining and 
mandatory primary school attendance.  These institutional effects features can be 
embedded in a Mincerian econometric framework. 
We incorporate labor market and educational institutions into a Mincerian 
analysis of Mexico.  This enables us to shed new light on the existence of, and reasons 
for, a variety of anomalies in the returns to education, including sheepskin effects.  We 
propose an alternative, institution driven explanation for sheepskin effects, arguing that a 
sheepskin effect may occur if particular diplomas are tied to jobs which exhibit 
downwards wage rigidity.   A central feature of our work is a natural experiment on the 
relationship between job-specific diplomas and labor market institutions that provides 
strong evidence in favor of this explanation of some anomalies in the Mincerian returns. 
  Mincerian returns are useful because they shed light on a number of issues.  On a 
macroeconomic level, they provide an indication of the efficiency of human capital 
markets.  In a sufficiently generalized Mincerian setting, one might spot shortages of 
particular skills.  For example, through the 1990s the Mexican government aggressively 
targeted an alleged shortage of technically skilled workers.  We test for shortages of 
technicians in Mexico in 2002 and find that such shortages, if they ever existed, are not 
evident in 2002.  
  Another, longer term, macroeconomic application of the Mincerian approach is to 
the question of indivisible investment goods.  Azariadis and Drezen (1990) propose that 
the presence of indivisible investment goods may be responsible for the divergent growth 
experiences of countries.  Galor and Zeira (1993) and Ljunqvist (1993) propose that 
education is such an indivisible good.  We find, somewhat paradoxically, that while in 
our sample educational attainment is clustered at diploma years, there is no evidence of 
indivisibility from the rates of return, other than at the primary school level. 
  Mincerian returns should be of interest to policy makers, especially those 
involved in education, labor and welfare policy, because of their implications for income 
distribution (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997).  This is more the case, due to the enormous 
impact of education on income, the fact that access to education is not uniformly 
distributed, and the sheer volume of public money allocated to education.  Our   5
specification helps to characterize determinants of the wage distribution including 
heterogeneous diplomas, labor market institutions and socio-demographic characteristics. 
  We examine the following issues.  Conceptually - we first ask whether signaling 
is the definitive explanation for sheepskin effects and provide an alternative one.  We 
then go on to formulate tests for diploma effects in second moments of the earnings 
distribution, and in the employment equation.  Empirically – we test for the presence of 
sheepskin effects in Mexico.  In doing so, we are careful to capture as much 
heterogeneity in diplomas and their recipients as possible in order to reduce the risk of 
false negatives.  We also ask whether certain institutions – unions, public sector 
employment practices, minimum wages, and diploma requirements for some jobs - are 
important in explaining Mincerian returns.  Some of them appear to be, though depending 
on the nature of the market, institutional effects may be eroded by market forces. 
  In addition to these contributions we develop a technical framework that is more 
general than those applied to date.  Because this model nests those used for most previous 
Mincerian studies, it allows us to test some of their assumptions.  Most importantly, we 
test the homoskedasticity assumption made by most authors, which we demonstrate 
potentially biases the wages predicted by the model, not just their standard errors.  
Second, we test for the presence of selectivity bias, as earnings are only defined for the 
employed. 
We also estimate the effects of education on the number of hours worked.  This is 
important because we find compelling evidence that education is associated with a 
shorter work week.  Thus, education probably has welfare consequences that would be 
missed when focusing on hourly earnings alone.   
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II develops the 
arguments underlying both explanations of sheepskin effects.  It also details a natural 
experiment to test whether job-specific diplomas and downwards rigid wages generate 
sheepskins, and motivates tests for sheepskins in the first and second moments of the 
earnings distribution.  Section III introduces the data and provides a description of the 
Mexican education system.  Section IV presents the econometric specification and 
formalizes our hypothesis tests.  Section V presents and interprets the model estimates   6
and hypothesis test results.  Section VI concludes.  Two appendices provide econometric 
derivations. 
 
II. Signaling and Institution Driven Sheepskin Effects 
  Sheepskins do not imply signaling and vice versa.  To date, studies in this area 
have tended to state this, test for sheepskins statistically, and then stop.  However, more 
can be said from a more detailed study.  In particular, the reasons for the existence of 
sheepskin effects can be broadly categorized in two.   
First, there is the signaling argument.  Essentially, this states that diploma receipt 
conveys positive information to employers regarding potential employees that could not 
be inferred in its absence.  This argument for a positive signaling effect requires two 
presumptions.  First, that the information inferable from a diploma is considerably greater 
than what is inferable from the successful completion of a non-diploma school-year.  
Second, it requires that this information is positive.  It seems uncontroversial to argue that 
if a diploma also carries a grade which permits wage offers to potential employees in 
accordance with their skills, then a sheepskin effect may not become evident in the 
expected earnings.  Weaker diplomas will carry a negative sheepskin, while stronger ones 
will carry a positive one.  In other words, the sheepskin effect may not be observable in 
the mean wage, but should be observable in the wage dispersion.  The literature to date 
has only focused on the first moment of the wage distribution.  We allow sufficient 
flexibility in our variance matrix to capture sheepskins in the second moments. 
  There is a second argument for the existence of positive sheepskin effects which, 
to our knowledge, has not been treated in the literature to date.  It is that they might result 
if particular diplomas are necessary for obtaining particular jobs.  A general equilibrium 
analysis of this argument reveals a further necessary condition: the wage paid by such 
jobs must be downwards rigid.  For, if it were not, the supply response in a competitive 
labor market would erode the premium on the diploma. We refer to this argument as the 
job-specific diploma hypothesis.  
We distinguish between teachers, technical high-school graduates and 
conventional high-school graduates in an effort to capture this story.  This is a good 
natural experiment for the following reasons.  Conventional high school degrees are   7
flexible in the job opportunities they offer.  Technical high school degrees and teaching 
certification lead to specific jobs.  Teachers’ earnings are strongly downwards rigid due 
to their position as unionized public sector employees,
1 while those of technical high 
school graduates probably are not.  Thus the job-specific diploma argument suggests that 
teaching degrees could carry an unusually high premium, while technical and formal 
high-school diplomas should reap roughly equal returns, despite the job-specificity of 
technical degrees. 
Note also that if jobs are tied to diplomas, we are unable to distinguish between 
different types of diplomas, and these different diplomas lead to jobs with varying pay 
scales, then we would also expect to see a sudden increase in the variance of earnings at 
diploma years.  Thus, evidence of an increase in the variance of earnings is necessary for 
confirmation of a signaling theory for sheepskin effects, but it will not suffice. 
  Diploma effects are likely to erode with experience, as the importance of 
diplomas gives way to that of employer recommendations and workplace performance.  
They may also be specific to gender, location (urban vs. rural).  Thus failure to estimate 
group-specific returns to education may return false negatives on sheepskin tests.  We 
therefore partition our sample according to gender, location and cohort to test for 
sheepskin effects more carefully. 
 
III.   The empirical environment: 
  The Mexican education system is a mixture of public and private institutions. The 
public institutions depend on the federal, state or municipal governments for funding.  
Even though many children attend kindergarten, it is not an official prerequisite for 
admission to primary school.
2  Formal education prior to college usually requires 
successful completion of 12 years: 6 of primary school, 3 of junior-high and 3 of high 
school. College typically takes five years to complete, although the duration does vary. 
  Parallel to the formal education track, analogous levels exist for technical 
education that provide a similar curriculum to the formal school system, complemented 
by vocational training.  We limit our analysis to technical high schools, dropping the few 
                                                 
1 139 out of 173 identifiable teachers in our sample are union members. 
2 This may vary according to states or the kind of school.  Many private schools do require some 
preprimary education.   8
workers with other levels of technical education from our sample.  Teachers in Mexico 
are trained at two levels.  A four year course after junior high yields a normalista degree.  
Teacher training at the college level yields a normalista-superior degree, though we are 
unable to distinguish its recipients from other college graduates. 
The data source for this study is ENIGH 2002 (Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y 
Gasto de los Hogares), which is a household income-expenditure survey, collected by 
INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica) in 2002.  Even though 
very similar surveys were collected for the years 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000, we 
refrain from using them because some education attainment information in these surveys 
was recorded categorically rather than by year. 
We pare down our sample using criteria that are standard in this literature. We do 
not include persons in our sample who are even partially self-employed, for fear of 
conflating returns to unreported capital ownership, with those to education.
3  Persons 
under 16 (the legal working age) and over 65 years old are also dropped.  Those reporting 
hours worked but no remuneration are stricken from the sample. Voluntarily unemployed 
persons - those reporting zero worked hours and not searching for a job, are also 
excluded. Persons working zero hours that are searching for a job are included in our 
analysis and categorized as unemployed.  Our sample of graduate degree recipients and 
those with incomplete teaching or technical high-school degrees was too thin for 
computational purposes and we were forced to drop them.  We also dropped those 
currently enrolled in school as their labor market decisions and opportunities are 
markedly different from the rest of our sample. 
Our dataset has two strengths.  First, it allows us to differentiate between different 
types of diplomas.  Second, it contains data on the successful completion of school years 
and diplomas, rather than just temporal measures of schooling.  As Jaeger and Page 
(1996) point out this is important because imputing completion from temporal data can 
bias results.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Smith and Metzger (1998) find, in a Mexican context, that failure to control for returns to capital biases 
estimates of returns to education upwards as educational attainment correlates positively with capital and 
earnings.   9
IV.  The Model and Hypothesis Tests: 
The Mincerian Equation  
  The most common Mincerian equation takes the following form: 
(1)  ( ) ￿
=
+ + + + = =
c h j p l
l Dl l sl E E o D s E E w y
, , ,
2
2 ln d d d d d , where w is a person’s hourly 
earnings, sometimes referred to as their implicit wage.  E, potential experience, is the 
maximum length of time they could have been in the labor force given their age and 
education.  l indexes the level of education (primary, junior-high, high-school and 
college).  sl measures the number of years of education level l completed, and is therefore 
bounded between zero and the number of school years required to complete that level.   
Dl indicates whether the lth diploma was received.  Because of the semi-logarithmic form 
of the equation, the exponential growth rate in percentage terms associated with years of 
experience and of schooling at level l are E E E 2 2d d +  and  sl d  respectively.  Similarly, 
( ) 1 exp - Dl d  is the percentage wage increase associated with receipt of diploma l over and 
above that conferred by completion of the final year of the degree.  Typically,  0 d  is 
permitted to vary with personal characteristics.  Notice that a specification that “corrects” 
for such personal characteristics through  0 d  still imposes constant returns to education 
and experience across the sample. 
  We generalize this specification before embedding it in a larger 3 equation 
likelihood structure.  Specifically, we know who in our sample received teaching 
certification or technical high-school degrees instead of formal high-school degrees.  We 
allow for different returns to these degrees, as well as different returns to college for 
formal and technical high school graduates.  Thus, our earnings equation is: 
(2) 
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where Dh, DT and DTeach are mutually exclusive indicators of receipt of a formal high-
school diploma, technical high-school diploma, or a normalista.  Recall that our sample 
excludes those who did not complete technical high-school.  Hence students with 
technical degrees are characterized by Dh=sh=0,DT=1, a total return to the degree over the 
three years of  ( ) 1 exp - DT d , and annual average rates of return to the degree of  3 DT d .    10
The superscripts PF and PT designate returns post-formal high school, and post-technical 
high school.   
 
Our Model: 
  We are interested in the determinants of three variables: employment (z i = 0 or 1), 
hours worked if employed (hi) , and the logarithm of hourly earnings if employed (yi).  In 
order to investigate these, we specify the following structure, based, in principle, on 
Heckman’s (1974) selection scheme.  Each person observed in the cross-section is 
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; 
 zi = 1 if 
*
i z = 0 and 0 otherwise; 
  hi = 
*
i h  if 
*
i z = 0 and is unreported otherwise; 
  yi = 
*
i y  if 
*
i z = 0 and is undefined otherwise. 
Thus, 
*
i z  is latent employment propensity while 
*
i h  and 
*
i y  are the latent hours 
and logged earnings potentials – observable only if a worker is employed.   i S  is a 
positive definite variance matrix for person i.  i q  and  i s  are the standard deviations of the 
“unexplained” components of the hours and logged earnings potentials respectively.  
Each of the ?ki is a correlation coefficient between unobservable components.  Thus, for 
example, finding ?3i<0 would indicate that if person i works less hours than our model 
predicts, they are also likely to earn more per hour than it predicts. 
The allowance for heteroskedasticity is implemented without loss of generality 
via the Cholesky decomposition: 
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where xji are worker characteristics that may condition the variance matrix.  From (3) and 
(4a) it follows that:   11
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Note that the five parameters of the variance matrix are exactly identified from the 
Cholesky matrix.  However, a given variance matrix only identifies the magnitudes of a1, 
a2, and a5, not their signs.  For the rest of this section, it is presumed that the signs of a1 
and a2 are constant and positive.  This eliminates the need for confusing caveats when 
proposing hypothesis tests.  The assumption that a1 and a2 have constant signs will be 
verified.    
The derivation of the log-likelihood function is relegated to appendix A.  
Appendix B derives the following expressions for the expectation and standard deviation 
of hourly earnings  ( ) ( )
* * exp i i y w =  for person i.   
(5a)  ( ) 2 exp ) (
2 *
i yi y i x w E s b + = , 
(5b)  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 * exp 2 exp exp ) .( . i i yi y i x w D S s s b - =  
This means that in the presence of conditional heteroscedastity in logged earnings 
(i.e. ?2, ?4, ?5, ? 0), a homoskedastic model is incapable of predicting not only the second, 
but also the first moment of earnings distribution, underestimating the expected earnings 
for persons subject to above average wage variability.  It also means that tests on y b do 
not suffice to test hypotheses regarding actual wages in a heteroskedastic world. 
  Next, we delineate the content of the main equations and the Cholesky matrix.  
Three criteria were used in selecting the conditioning variables.  First, would their 
inclusion allow us to estimate parameters crucial to our hypothesis tests?  Second, would 
their exclusion mingle returns to education for different types of people, resulting in 
erroneous acceptance of the null of no sheepskin effects?  Third, the consistency of our 
parameter estimates hinges on the veracity of our distributional assumptions (3).  We 
would therefore like to include variables whose exclusion is likely lead to 
misspecification.
4 
                                                 
4 It is desirable to test the distributional assumptions by means of a Breusch-Pagan test on the estimated 
standardized residuals ( i u ˆ ).  Regrettably, because 
*
i z is never observed, these estimates of ui are 
unobtainable.   12
  Logged wages,
*
i y , and employment propensity,
*
i z  are conditioned on exactly the 
components of the RHS of (2), except that a few intercept shifters are added.  Each 
equation is shifted by gender, region, and urban vs. rural location.  Union membership 
and holding a Normalista condition earnings, but not employment, as there are almost no 
unemployed union members or teachers in our sample.  For similar reasons, it was 
impossible to estimate separate employment effects of college for technical and high 
school graduates, and they are assumed to have the same coefficients on college 
education.
5  Additionally 
*
i z  is shifted by marital status and the interaction of marital 
status and gender.  Thus: 
(6a) 
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In principle, we could have conditioned hours,
*
i h , on the same Mincerian variables.   
However, as we do not have good reasons to propose the possibility of diploma effects in 
the hours equation, we include only four slopes - one for each level of schooling, 
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  The greatest drawback to using a Cholesky decomposition to impose positive 
definiteness on a heteroskedastic variance matrix is that it becomes impossible to 
condition one element of the variance matrix on an exogenous variable, without 
                                                 
5 Unlike the case of union members and teachers, this is not because a tiny fraction of them are 
unemployed, but because a tiny number of them are.  9 out of 200 technical high-school graduates with 
some college education are unemployed, loosely equiproportional with 105 out of 2057 of their formal high 
school counterparts.  Thus, imposing equality of the coefficients is unlikely to be costly.   13
inadvertently conditioning other variance parameters on it also.  Despite these 
constraints, it is clear from (4b) that the variables conditioning a1 and a2 will most 
strongly effect q  and s  respectively.  Similarly,  2 1,r r  and  3 r  can be conditioned 
through a3, a4 and a5 respectively.   
We thought of likely scenarios wherein an urban location, gender and 
membership of the teaching profession would condition all five elements of the variance 
matrix.  We therefore conditioned each Cholesky element on these characteristics.   
Similarly  3 2 1 , , r r r  and q  are conditioned on the number of years of schooling.
6  
Unionization was supposed to effectq ,s  and  3 r  for obvious reasons.  Finally, in 
keeping with the discussion of section II, s  was conditioned on the same variables a 
*
i y , 
through a2, in order to capture diploma effects in second moments.  Hence we have the 
following equations: 
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Hypothesis tests: 
This econometric structure allows us to test a variety of interesting hypotheses.  
We break these into five groups.  First, this structure nests those of most Mincerian 
studies, and there allows us to test some of their assumptions.  To the extent that these 
assumptions are rejected, results to prior studies are somewhat inconsistent.  We test the 
restrictions implied by a homoskedastic model ( j j " = , 0 g ) by means of a likelihood ratio 
test (LRT) on the difference between the homoskedastic and heteroskedastic model.  The 
resultant LRT statistic is distributed
2
) 33 ( c .  We also test for the presence of selectivity bias 
                                                 
6 The key to table 5 describes how the ‘schooling’ variable was constructed.   14
because 
*
i y  is undefined for the unemployed.  The null hypothesis of no selectivity bias is 
imposed through the restriction 0 4
0
4 = = g g , and the LRT statistic arising out of 
comparison with the full model is distributed
2
) 4 ( c . 
  Second, we check our priors on the signs of some of the intercept shifters.  While 
not all of these constitute central economic hypotheses of our paper, rejection of these 
common sense priors could signal problems with our specification.  We therefore check 
to see whether the coefficients of our model support the following statements, which we 
believe to be true in reality: ceteris paribus – (i) men work more (outside the home) than 
women  ( ) 0 >
M
h b ; (ii) earnings are highest in the North  ( ) 0 >
North
y b  and lowest in the 
South( ) 0 <
South
y b ; (iii) unionization increases earnings ( ) 0 >
U
y b , reduces hours( ) 0 <
U
h b , 
reduces the variance of earnings ( ) 0 2 <
U g  and hours ( ) 0 1 <
U g ; (iv)  Rural dwellers earn 
less( ) 0 <
R




h b b , while 
the reverse is true for women  ( ) 0 <
C
h b .  While we have no prior on the issue we do 
check to see whether men earn more or less than women, other things equal. 
Third, we enquire after the results of our natural experiment.  We begin by 
checking the null hypothesis that the expected log wage of formal and technical high-




y b b + 3 with
DT
y b .  Given the 
presumed absence of downwards rigidity in wages accruing to either type of graduate, 
our job-specific diploma hypothesis suggests they should be equal.  To test it more 
rigorously, we re-estimate the model with the equality imposed and test the restrictions 
via a 
2
) 1 ( c  LRT.  In order to test the equality of actual (not logged) wages predicted, we 
impose the additional assumption that
DT Dh sh
2 2 2 3 g g g = + , and compare the results to the 
full model by a 
2
) 2 ( c  LRT statistic.  The premium on a four year normalista  relative to a 


























y b b b b b b = + = + + , , 3 on the log wage premium using a 
2
) 2 ( c  LRT statistic relative to the full model.  We test for a teaching premium in the actual   15
wage premium by adding the corresponding restrictions on  2 g and testing them jointly 
using a 
2
) 4 ( c  LRT statistic. 
Fourth, we test for sheepskin effects.  Because sheepskins cannot be identified for 
teaching degrees and technical high school diplomas, these levels are excluded from the 
following tests.  The test in the first moments of the logged-earnings distribution for a 
sheepskin effect of the lth diploma simply corresponds to a students t-test of the 
alternative hypothesis that  0 >
Dl
y b  against the null 0 £
Dl
y b .  Similarly, the alternative 
hypotheses of sheepskin effects in second moments are tested via  0 2 >
Dl g .  Last, noting 
the possibility that diploma effects are expressed in terms of access to employment, we 
test for the presence of sheepskin effects in the employment equation  ( ) 0 >
Dl
z b .   
Fifth, we examine the behavior of hours.  We ask whether the length of the 
average work week trends with education in any interesting fashion. 
  Each of the above exercises is conducted on the full sample as well as sub-
samples drawn according to gender, urban vs. rural location and age respectively.  We do 
so in order to check for the possibility that pooling obscures important results. 
 
V.   Results: 
  We estimated the model delineated by equations (3), (4), (6) and (7) on the full 
sample of 16,675 workers.
7  The results are presented in table 1.  All references to 
parameter estimates in the following section are to these numbers.  We analyzed key 
features of the model for a variety of profiles using the delta method.  Figures 1,2 and 4 
provide the results for an urban, non-union, married male from central Mexico with five 
years of labor market experience.  Figure 3 is for the same profile, although results are 
from estimates for the male and female sub-samples.  Results for the other profiles we 
have looked at do not differ qualitatively.  We also estimated the model on the following 
sub-samples for reasons outlined in section II: males, females, urban dwellers and young 
                                                 
7 The implicit wage is calculated as the ratio of all wage and salary income to hours worked in the last 
quarter.  Potential experience is: age – years of schooling – 4.   16
workers (those no older than 30).
8  The qualitative results are exactly the same in all 
samples, with the exception of those relating to the hours worked by men and women.
9   
  Turning to the first group of hypotheses described in section IV, we test two 
maintained hypotheses of previous Mincerian studies.  The null hypothesis that the model 
is homoskedastic is soundly rejected.  This is obvious from the significance of the 
majority of the variables conditioning the Cholesky elements.  More formally, we test 
this in the first row of table 2 via a LRT, and unambiguously reject the null.  We note, 
however, that allowing for heteroskedasticity did not change our qualitative results 
regarding the existence of sheepskin effects in log wages.  The value of the 
heteroskedastic model lies in its ability to capture results in second moments, as well as 
to consistently estimate wages (not logged).  As indicated in equation (5), a 
homoskedastic model cannot consistently predict wages in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity.  Figure 1 shows that the variance of log wages varies with education. 
Figure 3 demonstrates that the variance of hours varies with education, but only for 
women. 
  Similarly, the null that selection into employment does not bias results is rejected.  
Figure 4 demonstrates that for our reference profile 2 r  is definitely negative.  This 
indicates that workers with higher earnings potential are less likely to be employed, 
ceteris paribus, and that models that fail to correct for selection by employment are 
therefore likely to underestimate log wages.  We test the null rigorously in the second 
row of table 2, and reject it firmly. 
  Turning next to the simple hypotheses regarding the mean and variance intercept 
shifters, we find statistically significant confirmation of each of them.  From the ‘logged 
earnings’ column in table 1, we note that hourly earnings in the North are 13% higher 
than those in central Mexico, while workers in the South own about 20% less.
10
  Union 
members earn an extra 43% per hour, while rural dwellers earn 34% less than their urban 
counterparts in nominal terms.  The size of these effects gave us pause and motivated 
estimation of the model on sub-samples, although the qualitative effects we are interested 
                                                 
8 The sample sizes for these cross sections were: 11248, 5427, 13128 and 7365 respectively.   
9 Results for sub-samples are available on request, as are post-estimation results for other profiles. 
10 For any log-wage intercept shifter, b , the percentage increase in earnings is  1 -
b e .   17
in did not vary with sub-sample.  From the ‘hours’ column, we find that on average men 
work 2 hours more per week than women, and married men work 4 hours more than 
bachelors while married women work 4.6 hours less than spinsters.  Union members 
work 3.4 hours less per week.   
  The Cholesky terms a1 and a2 which condition the variances of hours and hourly 
earnings respectively are positive in every profile we looked at.  It follows that the sign of 
an intercept shifter in these equations applies also to its impact on the corresponding 
variance term, although its magnitude does not.  Hence, as predicted, union membership 
reduces the variance of earnings and hours.  The confirmation of each of our priors by 
our model suggests that our data and specification provide a valid description of Mexican 
labor market outcomes.   
Although we did not have a prior on this, we find that men earn around 20% more 
than women on an hourly basis.  While this could be due to discrimination, we stress the 
importance of other, possibly complimentary interpretations.  For example, as we will 
argue below, figure 3 might indicate that women choose different occupations, 
substituting flexibility in work hours for pay. 
  Our third set of hypotheses relate to our natural experiment.  Beginning with the 
high-school coefficients of the ‘logged earnings’ equation, we find that the total 
Mincerian return over three years of formal high-school is 38.9%
11, compared with 
38.2% for a technical high-school degree.  The standard errors on the relevant 
coefficients suggest that this is not likely to be a statistically significant difference.  In the 
third row of table 2 we report a p-value of 0.88 from a
2
) 1 ( c test on the null hypothesis that 
the returns are equal.  As (5) suggests, though, a test in the predicted log wage could 
obscure actual wage differences only visible in the variance of log wages.  A 
2
) 2 ( c  LRT 
on the null in actual wages (Table 2, row 4) finds little evidence of a disparity, with a p-
value of 0.30.  Note that a cursory check of the corresponding coefficients in the ‘a2’ 
column indicates that the variance of logged earnings is a little higher for technical 
graduates.  This means that technical high-school graduates earn slightly more than 
formal graduates, as is visible in figure 2.  This is an example of the insufficiency of the 
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homoskedastic Mincerian model for testing hypotheses about the wage distribution.  
However the difference is not statistically significant in this case. 
  Figure 2 provides visual confirmation of the above results.  Note also that though 
the difference between wages for technical and formal graduates was insignificant at the 
end of high-school, and annual rates of return were roughly equal at around 15%, the 
heteroskedastic Mincerian specification allows for a large wage difference between them 
by the end of college. 
Turning next to those with normalistas, we estimate a Mincerian rate of return 
over 4 years of 138%.  Formal and technical high-school graduates with a year of college 
both earn  4-year returns of 62.08% and 62.13% respectively.  For rigor, we tested the 
results more formally through LRTs.  In row 5 of table 2 we reject powerfully the null 
hypothesis that those with normalistas and those with either high school diploma plus 
one year of college earn the same log-wage.  In row 6 we test the analogous hypothesis 
for the actual wage by imposing the relevant restrictions on 2 g  and reject it.  The 
consistency of these results with the predictions of the job specific diploma hypothesis is 
almost uncanny.  Normalistas, which are required for teaching jobs whose wages are 
downwards rigid, receive an abnormally high rate of return.  The rate of return to 
technical high-school degrees, which are tied to jobs whose wages are more competitive, 
is the same as that to formal high-school.  Job-specific diplomas can generate sheepskins 
if, and only if, the wages paid by these jobs are downwards rigid. 
  Our fourth set of hypothesis tests seeks sheepskin effects.  In the ‘logged 
earnings’ column of table 1, we find strong evidence of sheepskin effects in the first 
moments at a primary level, with almost no return for pre-diploma primary years.  The 
diploma is associated with a 15% wage premium, while each non-diploma years boosts 
wages by a meager 0.6%.   The ‘a2’ column provides compelling evidence of a positive 
primary sheepskin effect in 2
nd moments.  In the employment equation there is also 
evidence of a negative primary sheepskin effect.  No other levels of the formal school 
system carry a sheepskin effect in first or second moments of logged earnings, or in the 
employment equation. 
  These results conjure up a rather vivid picture of equilibrium in a labor market 
segmented between workers with only primary degrees and those without primary   19
degrees.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that some employers in Mexico take the receipt of 
a primary diploma to signal literacy.  This may be why many jobs, especially those in the 
formal sector, require one explicitly.  Thus workers without a diploma may be restricted 
to a heavily contested, more informal market.  In the presence of a wage premium for 
diplomas, equilibrium across the two markets can only be sustained if the with-diploma 
market experiences higher unemployment – a la Harris and Todaro (1970).  Our finding 
of a positive primary sheepskin in log earnings and a negative sheepskin in employment 
is highly evocative of such an equilibrium.  The positive sheepskin in the variance of log-
earnings suggests, reasonably, that the job opportunities available to primary diploma 
holders are more varied. 
The missing piece of the puzzle is the reason why the wage premium is not bid 
away.  Certainly, if primary graduation required arduous or costly efforts a separating 
equilibrium could be a plausible answer.  We feel that labor market distortions may offer 
better explanations.  We have some, albeit weak, evidence that minimum wages bind 
more tightly for diploma holders.  Despite the negligible earnings increases with primary 
years, non-diploma holders are twice as likely to earn less than the minimum wage of 5 
pesos per hour.
12  This could certainly sustain an equilibrium with unemployment and a 
modest wage premium in the degreed sector.  Another possibility is that the small number 
of workers without primary degrees are somehow constrained by poverty, the absence of 
adult education programs and the like, from obtaining them, despite the premium they 
carry.   
  The finding that there are almost no diploma effects is especially interesting, 
maybe even paradoxical, in light of figure 5.  In this histogram of schooling completion 
in our sample there is obvious evidence of clustering at diploma years (years 7, 10, 13 
and 18).  Education is obtained in discrete levels, even if the Mincerian returns do not 
suggest a reason for this.  Clustering may be due to changes across diploma years in the 
direct costs of education or the non-pecuniary benefits of education, neither of which 
factor into a Mincerian specification. 
                                                 
12 Of those with no education beyond primary, 889 out of  3367 non- diploma holders earn below the 
minimum wage, compared to 445 out of 3029 diploma holders.   20
  Finally, we turn to the ‘hours’ equation.  As shown statistically above, the hours 
worked by men and women differ from each other and correlate differently with marital 
status.  We therefore focus discussion of the length of the work-week on the results 
derived from the male and female sub-samples separately (figure 3).  The length of the 
work-week for a bachelor fitting our reference profile declines with formal education, 
from 54.2 hours for the uneducated to 46.9 for a college graduate.  For spinsters it rises 
from 36.4 hours for the uneducated, peaks at 42.7 for those with a high-school diploma, 
and then falls to 37.6 hours at college graduation.  This coincides well with results from 
Mehta and Villarreal (2003), which documents, using data from 2000, significantly 
higher returns to primary, junior-high, and high-school education for women.  Many 
Mexican women work in clerical positions which require junior-high or high-school 
education and regulated work hours.  This would explain why women’s wages and hours 
track education as they do, and why the standard deviation of their hours worked falls 
with education (figure 3). 
The mostly inverse relationship between education and hours worked, coupled 
with significantly negative estimates of  3 r (see figure 4) may suggest that there are basic 
necessities which workers with lower earnings potential must labor longer hours to 
afford.  Another likely explanation for the negative correlation between the earnings and 
hours residuals is simply that hours are in the denominator of earnings, so that those who 
work more than our model predicts will also tend to earn less than predicted per hour. 
 
VI.  Conclusions: 
  We seek to shed more light on Sheepskin effects and Mincerian returns to 
education.  We develop a 3-equation maximum likelihood specification for an extended 
Mincerian model, with conditional heteroskedasticity.  Using this specification and 2002 
data from Mexico we pursue three lines of questioning.  First, we ask whether signaling 
is the definitive explanation for sheepskin effects.  We propose an alternative, possibly 
complimentary explanation: sheepskins may result from job-specific diplomas if, and 
only if, the wage paid by these jobs are downwards rigid. Second, we test for the 
implications of these two explanations of sheepskin effects in the second moments of the   21
wage distribution.  Third, we ask what happens on the quantity abscissa of the labor 
market (i.e. unemployment) when sheepskins are seen in wages. 
We find extremely strong evidence in support of the job-specific diplomas 
hypothesis in the results of a natural experiment.  Despite the job-specificity of technical 
high school degrees, they confer the same returns as formal high-schools.  Teaching 
degrees, which lead to a specific job with a downwards rigid wage, confer more than 
twice the return of either high-school degree.  We find positive primary sheepskins in 
both moments of the wage distribution and a negative one on employment, but no other 
evidence of diploma effects, despite allowing for diploma and recipient heterogeneity.  
Our results suggest that where labor markets are segmented according to diplomas, 
equilibrium is restored through unemployment amongst diploma holders.  Our results on 
hours suggest that much of what is observed regarding Mincerian returns may be driven 
by behavior in the denominator of implicit wages (hours), rather then just their numerator 
(salaries). 
Our work suggests interesting directions for future research.  First, our 
specification allows us to capture imbalances in the distribution of skills through the 
returns to heterogeneous diplomas.   Thus, by applying it to data from Mexico through 
the 1990s, we should be able to trace the formation and resolution of imbalances in 
Mexican human capital markets in response to NAFTA.  Second, some of the results 
regarding conditional heteroskedasticity in the covariance between earnings and 
employment invite application of a variant of our model to the empirical modeling of job 
search strategies.  Our sense from our results is that such work might demonstrate how 








   22
References: 
Arrow, Kenneth, 1973, “Higher Education as a Filter”, Journal of Political Economy, 2(3), 193-196. 
Azariadis, Costas and A. Drezen, 1990, “Threshold Externalities in Economic Development”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 501-26.  
Becker, Gary S., 1967, Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income, Ann Arbor Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Belman, Dale and John S. Heywood, 1991, “Sheepskin Effects in the returns to education: An Examination 
of Women and Minorities”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 73, 720-724. 
Card, David, 2001, “Estimating The Return to Schooling:  Progress on Some Persistent Econometric 
Problems”, Econometrica, 69(5), 1127-1160. 
Chiswick, Barry R., 1973, “Schooling, Screening and Income”, in Does College Matter?, Lewis Solmon 
and Paul Taubman (eds.), Academic Press, New York. 
Fortin and Lemieux, 1997, “Institutional Changes and Rising Wage Inequality,”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 11, 75-96. 
Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira, 1993, “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics”, Review of Economic 
Studies, 60: 35-52. 
Goldberger, Arthur, 1991, A Course in Econometrics, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University 
Press. 
Harris and Todaro, 1970, “Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis,” 
American Economic Review, 40, 126-42. 
Heckman, James, 1974, “Shadow wages, market prices, and labor supply,” Econometrica, 42, 679-94. 
Hungerford, Thomas and Gary Solon, 1987, “Sheepskin Effects in the Returns to Education, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 69, 175-177. 
Jaeger, David and Marianne Page, 1996, “Degrees Matter: New Evidence on Sheepskin Effects in the 
Returns to Education”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, 733-740. 
Ljungqvist, Lars, 1993, “Economic Underdevelopment: The case of a missing market for human capital”, 
Journal of Development Economics, 40, 219-39.  
Mehta, Aashish and Hector Villarreal, 2003, “Mincerian Returns to Education in Mexico: Sheepskins and 
Sources of Heterogeneity”, University of Wisconsin – Madison, Working Paper. 
Mincer, Jacob, 1974, Schooling, Experience and Earnings,  New York:  Columbia University Press. 
Mwabu, Germano and T. Paul Schultz, 1996, “Education Returns Across Quantiles of the Wage Function: 
Alternative Explanations for Returns to Education by Race in South Africa”, AEA Papers and 
Proceedings, 82(2), 335-339. 
Psacharopoulos, George, 1985,  “Returns to Education:  A further International Update and Implications” 
Journal of Human Resources 20(4), 583-604.  
Riley, John G., 1979, “Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis”, Journal of Political Economy, 
87(5), S227-S252. 
Smith, Paula A. and Michael R. Metzger, 1998, “The Return to Education: Street Vendors in Mexico”, 
World Development, 26(2), 289-296. 
Spence, A. M., 1974, Market Signaling, Harvard University Press, Cambridge . 
 
 
   23
Appendix A:  Derivation of the likelihood function. 
  The sample is divided between those members of the labor force who are 
employed (zi=1), and those who are not (zi=0).  Hence, if f( ) denotes the distribution of 
potential hours and log earnings conditional on employment, the log-likelihood function 
is of the form: 
(A1)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ￿ ￿
= =




1 , 1 Pr ln 0 Pr ln
i i z
i i i i
z
i z h y f z z LLF .   
We suppress i for notational purposes for the rest of the derivation.  Let F denote the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function.  As usual: 
(A2)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) y y y y x e x z z b b - F = £ + = £ = = 0 Pr 0 Pr 0 Pr
* .   
Further, the joint density of 
* *,h y  and z in braces in (A1) can be factored differently, and 
expressed in terms of the latent 
* z , rather than z: 
(A3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * * * * * * * , , 0 Pr , , 1 Pr 1 , 1 Pr h y g h y z h y g h y z z h y f z > = = = = = ,  
where g( ) is the joint density of 
*
i y  and 
*
i h  only.   
  Following Goldberger (1991), pp.196-97, our normality assumptions (3) imply 
that ( ) ( ) 11 1

































































y y h h
z z









3 2 1 *
2 1 1
 and 






22 r r - + + - = S C AC A ( ) 3 2 1 r r r - = A ;  ( ) 3 1 2 r r r - = C . 
Thus,  





* * * , 0 Pr S F = > m h y z  and 
(A6)  ( )
* *,h y g  is the bivariate normal pdf characterized by  ( ) 11 1,S m .  
Backwards sequential substitution of (A1)-(A6) yield the log likelihood function. 
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Appendix B:  Derivation of moments of the actual wage distribution 
Logged earnings (
*
i y ) are distributed over the range (-8,8) according to the pdf: 
(B1a)  ( ) ( ) ( ) i yi y i i i x y y f s b f s - =
* * 1 ) (  and cdf: 
(B1b)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i yi y i i i i x y y Y y F s b - F = £ =
* * * * Pr , where f  and Fare the standard 
normal pdf and cdf respectively. 
Because ( )
* * exp i i y w = , earnings fall in the range (0, 8), with cdf: 
(B2a)     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i yi y i i i i i i x w w Y w W w G s b - F = £ = £ =
* * * * * * ln ln Pr Pr , and pdf 
(B2b)    ( ) ( ) ( ) i yi y i i i i i i x w w w w G w g s b f s - = ¶ ¶ =
- * 1 * * * * ln ) ( ) ( . 
Then it is straightforward in principle to solve the integrals for:  
(B3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 exp
2
0
* * * *
i yi y i i i i x dw w g w w E s b + = =￿
¥
, and 
(B4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
2 2
0
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Table 1.  Parameter estimates for the full sample.*               
      Equation 
   (n=16675)  Employment  Hours  Logged Earnings  a2 
      coeff.  std. err.  coeff.  std. err.  coeff.  std. err.  coeff.  std. err. 
   Constant  -0.2603  0.0892  47.8348  0.7032  1.5335  0.0416  0.6451  0.0285 
   Union        -3.3819  0.3020  0.3585  0.0144  -0.1352  0.0083 
   Rural  0.1251  0.0421  -1.3226  0.2950  -0.4213  0.0200  -0.0217  0.0306 
   Male  -0.3234  0.0426  2.0179  0.3601  0.1833  0.0141  0.0706  0.0187 
Intercept  North  -0.1516  0.0368  -0.4552  0.2377  0.1187  0.0129      
Shifters  South  0.1020  0.0438  2.1727  0.2445  -0.2317  0.0141      
   Married  0.8161  0.0876  -4.5950  0.3589            
   Married Male  0.1236  0.0949  8.5991  0.4402            
   Experience  0.0216  0.0047  0.1110  0.0306  0.0384  0.0018  -0.0118  0.0009 
   Experience squared  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0032  0.0005  -0.0005  0.0000  0.0002  0.0000 
                          
   Primary years  0.3016  0.0138  -0.3746  0.0807  0.0063  0.0073  -0.0230  0.0047 
   Primary diploma  -0.6232  0.0854      0.1428  0.0308  0.0802  0.0196 
   Junior-high years  0.0096  0.0509  0.1155  0.1011  0.0657  0.0156  0.0031  0.0081 
   Junior-high diploma  0.1169  0.1423      -0.0150  0.0436  -0.0190  0.0224 
Schooling  Formal high-school years  0.0220  0.0850  -0.1996  0.1388  0.1167  0.0190  0.0316  0.0108 
Effects  Formal high-School diploma  -0.4006  0.2506      -0.0261  0.0582  0.0302  0.0328 
   3 year technical high-school degree  -0.1556  0.0753  -0.3506  0.4156  0.3286  0.0254  0.1620  0.0141 
   4 year normalista            0.8746  0.0558  0.0876  0.0316 
   College years, post formal        -0.9006  0.1027  0.1589  0.0104  0.0099  0.0067 
   College diploma, post formal            -0.0019  0.0457  -0.0555  0.0308 
   College years, post technical        -0.1257  0.1989  0.1546  0.0242  -0.0419  0.0218 
   College years, post formal        -8.7582  1.0458  -0.1200  0.1290  0.1301  0.1144 
   College years, all HS graduates  0.0320  0.0279                
   College diploma, all HS graduates  -0.0072  0.1338                
                          
      a1  a3  a4  a5 
      coeff.  std. err.  coeff.  std. err.  coeff.  std. err.  coeff.  std. err. 
   Constant  13.2330  0.3220  -10.6251  0.6839  -0.4810  0.0342  -0.5133  0.0227 
   Union  -1.2439  0.1575            -0.0220  0.0113 
   Rural  1.2803  0.1686  0.1541  0.6405  -0.2984  0.0311  -0.0399  0.0268 
   Male  -0.7619  0.1837  5.2158  0.5177  0.0980  0.0242  0.1600  0.0171 
   Normalista  0.8919  0.6274            -0.1806  0.0406 
   Schooling  -0.0920  0.0225  0.7215  0.0473  0.0040  0.0028  0.0222  0.0018 
*  Bold coefficients indicate 95% significance.                 26
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Table 2.  Likelihood Ratio Test Results: Comparisons to the unrestricted model:** 




value   
1.  Homoskedasticity  -80,163.46  1343.10  34  0.0000   
2.  No self selection  -79,580.99  178.15  4  0.0000   
3.  Formal - Technical log wage equality  -79,491.92  0.02  1  0.8784   
4.  Formal - Technical wage equality  -79,493.10  2.38  2  0.3042   
5.  Formal - Technical - Normalista log wage equality  -79,516.03  48.24  2  0.0000   
6.  Formal - Technical - Normalista log wage equality  -79,516.20  48.58  4  0.0000   




           
   Years of           
Degree Year  Schooling           
No education  0           
Kindergarten  1           
Primary, year 1  2           
Primary, year 2  3           
Primary, year 3  4           
Primary, year 4  5           
Primary, year 5  6           
Primary Graduation  7           
Junior-high, year 1  8           
Junior-high, year 2  9           
Junior-high Graduation  10           
Formal High-school, year 1  11           
Formal High-school, year 2  12           
Formal High-school Graduation  13           
Technical High-School Degree  13           
Normalista  14           
College, year 1  14           
College, year 2  15           
College, year 3  16           
College, year 4  17           
College Graduation  18           
 